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## Special Issue

Deliberative Democracy

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Groups and Deliberation



# Groups and Deliberation

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*We present a group-based approach to the study of deliberation. Deliberation occurs in groups, yet many studies of deliberation do not take the group as a unit of analysis. We argue that group composition and the attendant social dynamics to which they give rise are an important aspect of deliberation. We offer several examples of ways to study these effects, including the interaction of gender composition and the group's decision rule in the context of an experimental study of decisions about justice, the effect of racial composition in simulated juries, and the effect of ideological composition in local meetings. We examine the consequences of these factors on a variety of outcomes, including individuals' private opinion, individuals' behaviour, and group decisions. In conclusion we discuss the implications that group effects have for empirical and normative theories of deliberation.*

KEYWORDS: Deliberation • Group • Group Composition • Justice • Juries • Local Meetings • Gender • Race • Ideology

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Deliberation has received a great deal of scholarly attention, but despite this well-known “deliberative turn” (Chambers 2003: 307), scholars have not focused sufficiently on a crucial aspect of deliberation: it takes place in groups. Our approach to deliberation holds that groups and group-level processes are central to understanding deliberative dynamics and outcomes; indeed the group is a necessary and defining feature of deliberative interaction. We seek to “bring the group back in” because, we assert, we cannot fully capture the value – or the potential pitfalls – of deliberation without thinking seriously about the social and psychological processes that occur when individuals interact in group settings. Deliberation is not

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merely constructed by the aggregation of individual deliberators; it is subject to the dynamics of the interacting group. We apply a group lens to the analysis of deliberation and illustrate some initial insights that this perspective can provide.

Our definition of small groups is drawn in part from Verba: small groups are places where “face-to-face communication is possible among all members” (1961: 12). This definition is broad: it can include gatherings as small as three and as many as dozens of people. Small groups of this kind are a ubiquitous aspect of political life: work teams, juries, committees, boards or councils, judicial panels, neighbourhood meetings, and even comparatively larger legislative debates or public hearings all fall comfortably under our definition. Public discussion in such settings is widely practised. To take just one example, nearly 75% of Americans report that they have attended a public meeting or hearing at some point in their lives, and approximately 97% of localities in the United States rely on public hearings as a way of soliciting citizen comment (Karpowitz 2006). Similarly, more than 400 cities offer opportunities for civic dialogue in small group discussion settings (Walsh 2004).

Despite the widespread practice of face-to-face communication in small groups, most of the scholarly attention to these settings has focused on *individual-level* effects – how individuals learn, change, or reason when they participate (see, for example, Barabas 2004; Fishkin 1997; Sturgis, Roberts and Allum 2005, but see Mansbridge 1983 for a classic and important exception and Druckman 2004 for a more recent example of laudable attention to group effects). Some have argued that group-level effects are likely to be small or nonexistent (Luskin et al. 2002), and a study of online deliberation (which, notably, does not include the face-to-face element central to our definition) found no group effects on individuals randomly assigned to one of 60 homogenous or heterogeneous group conditions (Price et al. 2002). Nonetheless, long traditions in social psychology, economics, and sociology point to the critical importance of group-level analysis (see Mendelberg 2002 for a thorough overview). We find the general failure to attend to the group in studies of deliberation (and its normative implications) to be a puzzling oversight.

One scholar who has taken findings from the social psychology of groups seriously and applied them to modern studies of deliberation is Cass Sunstein (2000 and 2002). Sunstein is especially concerned about the problem of group polarization, defined as the predictable movement of deliberating group members “toward a more extreme point in the direction

indicated by the members' predeliberation tendencies" (2002: 176). Such shifts are especially likely to be found in groups with extremist tendencies and in groups that generate a firm shared identity. The idea of group polarization is not new (see Moscovici and Zavalloni 1969; Myers and Lamm 1976), but Sunstein has actively worked to apply the idea to deliberative settings. He contrasts the classic competing models of polarization – social comparison and the group's pool of persuasive arguments. Social comparison means that people want to be perceived favourably by other group members, and they also want to perceive themselves favourably. They thus take on positions they perceive to be socially favoured within the group. The collective effect is to move the entire group in the direction of its predeliberation tendencies. The persuasive arguments explanation emphasizes the pool of arguments available to the group. In groups with limited argument pools, group members do not have as many opportunities to consider alternative perspectives and are thus more likely to shift in the direction of arguments articulated most often.

While we hail Sunstein's attempts to merge deliberative theory and social psychology, we are wary of approaches to groups and group deliberation that label group effects as necessarily negative or non-deliberative. Group-level factors may send deliberation off the rails (see Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), but they may also contribute to deliberative success. Sunstein himself recognizes that not all groups polarize and that the composition of the deliberating group, among other factors, may have a profound effect on the presence and magnitude of group-level effects. He thus places great weight on the institutional conditions under which deliberators come together. We agree strongly that one of the most important contributions empirically-minded scholars of deliberation can make is to identify the group-level conditions under which deliberation is likely to have the effects deliberative theorists hope to achieve as well as the conditions under which it may fall far short of those goals. As one of us has previously written, group-level forces may often "work against the kind of conversation that deliberative advocates wish to see. Still, group forces can also be harnessed for more deliberative ends. In any case, deliberation must contend with the social model, whether to deepen its negative effects or harness its positive consequences" (Mendelberg 2002: 180).

What do we mean by group-based public discussion that meets deliberative goals? This is not an easy question, given the multiplicity of theoretical approaches present in the burgeoning literature on deliberative theory (e.g., Barber 1984; Benhabib 1996; Chambers 1996; Cohen 1989; Dryzek 2000;

Fishkin 1997; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 2004; Habermas 1989, 1996; Macedo 1999; Sanders 1997; Warren 1992, 1996; Young 1996). Broadly, we assert that discussion meets the standards deliberative theorists hope for when it is “reflective, open to a wide range of evidence, respectful of different views. It is a rational process of weighing the available data, considering alternative possibilities, arguing about relevance and worthiness, and then choosing the best policy or person” (Walzer 1999: 58). Deliberation is more than informal discussion; it is, at bottom, committed to public reason-giving among groups of people who often lack close social ties but who must come to a collective decision together (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Deliberation, ideally, is a process of communication in which people must address needs and perspectives quite different from their own. Those needs and perspectives are conveyed through reasoned arguments that are universal and generalisable, drawing on basic understandings with which other participants can agree (Chambers 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Successful deliberation may or may not end in deep opinion change, but it will show evidence that deliberators have recognized and respectfully engaged a range of relevant political ideas and issue stances.

Having sketched the basic outlines of our contention that groups matter for deliberation, we now review several different studies we have undertaken – some separately, some together – that collectively comprise the beginnings of our ongoing research programme. These studies are diverse in approach. Some make use of experimental methods, and others draw upon observations of actual group deliberation in practice. We believe these studies indicate both the promise of group-based empirical studies and the need for considerable further work. Our hope is to provoke additional research (from both ourselves and others), because we contend that the field “needs more work that highlights groups and that is characterized by forceful, provocative arguments, definitive tests of sharply opposing hypotheses, demonstrations of unexpected and striking findings, and the other traits of the [earlier] literatures on groups” (Mendelberg 2005: 641).

### **The Deliberative Justice Experiment**

We begin with a study of how groups affect deliberation about social justice and income redistribution. We came to this study inspired by the large literature in social psychology on group dynamics, which characterizes the group as “greater than the sum of the parts” (Lewin 1951). One important

aspect of group dynamics is group norms. Norms can affect group dynamics in at least four (often complementary) ways – they may reinforce consensual values, provide information about reality, shape the balance of arguments for or against a position, and regulate social status within the group (Forsyth 1999).<sup>2</sup> We expect that some systematic features of groups that deliberate and make decisions about politics will have important effects on the salience and power of group norms. One such feature is the rule by which the group makes definitive decisions – for example, unanimous versus majority rule. With its demand for consensus, unanimous rule appears to create the expectation that the group will behave as one, while majority rule implies that individuals are expected to disagree with one another (Mansbridge 1983). One seminal study of mock juries, for example, reports that people told to decide with unanimous rule were more likely to shift their views during discussion than people assigned to majority rule juries (Hastie et al. 1983: 102). Deliberation may, we hypothesized, become more norm-driven with unanimous than majority rule.

The other structural factor that can shape norms and affect deliberation is the gender composition of the group. Because they are socialized to care for others and because of their distinctive economic experiences, women are more likely to empathize with the less well off in society and operate on the principle of need (Scott et al. 2001). But importantly, small differences between individual men and women are enhanced by the group's face-to-face discussion. Thus gender composition – the number of women in the group – may matter more than the individual's own gender, as small individual differences become amplified during interaction. Studies have shown that norms of interaction differ with gender composition, with female groups more oriented toward consensus, equality, intimacy, self-disclosure and conflict-avoidance (Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007). The group's process is gendered in a way that produces different norms in male versus female groups.

Our expectation, then, is that group gender effects will be amplified or dampened by the relative strength of the group's norms. In predominantly female groups, the average member is likely to begin with an inclination to

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<sup>2</sup> For example, in a classic study Muzafer Sherif used the “autokinetic effect” – the “illusory movement of a stationary pinpoint of light in a dark room” – to show how interaction between people creates stable group norms that tell people how to perceive reality (Forsyth 1999; Sherif 1966). In situations of uncertainty, as with the autokinetic effect, where no unambiguous reference point exists, Sherif found that the group generates the reference point because individuals assume that “the group must be right” (Cialdini and Trost 1998).

relative generosity and cooperation. In these groups, a strong group norm will generate greater levels of group generosity than a weak norm would. Conversely, in the predominantly male groups, the average member is likely to begin with a lower inclination to generosity and a higher inclination toward competition. A strong group norm will generate less generosity and a more competitive atmosphere than would a weak group norm. Put differently, the impact of gender composition will vary with the strength of the group norm. When a group norm is strong, gender will have a polarizing effect on groups. When a group norm is relatively weaker, gender will have a smaller or no polarizing effect on groups.

The decision rule is likely to provide this difference in norm strength. The unanimous condition is likely to generate stronger group norms – whether of cooperation and generosity or of competition and stinginess – than the majority rule condition. Unanimity is thus more likely to polarize groups, sending predominantly female groups off toward an extreme of generosity and predominantly male groups off into their extreme of stinginess.

To test these expectations, we used data originally collected by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992), who employed group deliberation as part of a larger experiment designed to test Rawls' predictions about redistribution (Rawls 1971). Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and their colleagues studied how people actually choose under a simulated veil of ignorance. The participants in their experiments were told that they would perform some tasks to earn money, but before doing so and before they were told the nature of the tasks, they were to deliberate together and choose a principle that would simultaneously govern the income they would later earn during the experiment (which was translated into a yearly income equivalent) and apply (hypothetically) to the society at large. Frohlich and Oppenheimer concluded that the veil of ignorance does indeed lead people to converge on a principle of distribution (the effects of which people found quite satisfying). That principle, however, is not Rawls's. Approximately 75% of the people chose not to maximize the income of the poorest, but to maximize the average income of the group while guaranteeing a floor below which the worst off member of the group would not be allowed to fall.

In setting this floor amount, the groups varied a great deal in their generosity toward the poor, something Frohlich and Oppenheimer did not explore but which relates directly to deliberative expectations. According to deliberative expectations, the better the group's deliberation, the more empathetic the group's decisions will be, and the more the group will consider the adequacy of its floor guarantee. In other words, good deliberation

should produce a more generous floor amount. In addition, while Frohlich and Oppenheimer experimentally manipulated the decision rule, they concluded that it makes very little difference. However, if our expectations about group dynamics are correct, the decision rule may influence the extent to which the discussion was empathetic and the level of group generosity toward the poor.

We analysed all deliberating groups for which both individual data and a discussion transcript were available, and all non-deliberating control groups – 24 groups and 120 individuals in total. All groups consisted of five individuals who were not close friends. The groups varied in their gender composition, with most consisting of 3 or 4 males and 1 or 2 females (two groups were all-male, no group was all-female).

We first analysed the floor amount – the minimum income guaranteed to the poor – chosen by the group. We treated the floor amount as a valid summary measure of the group preferences regarding distributive justice. According to deliberative expectations, the better the group's deliberation, the more empathetic the group's decisions will be, and the more the group will consider the adequacy of its floor guarantee. Following Gutmann and Thompson's (1996) definition, good deliberation should produce a floor amount that would provide for a "decent life". We find that higher female composition does in fact correspond to more generosity in the unanimous rule condition. When unanimous groups are composed entirely of men, they behave quite stingily, providing only \$6'784, almost a third less than the multi-study average of \$9'900 and nearly 40% lower than the actual poverty line in the US. By Gutmann and Thompson's standard, that fails as a good deliberative decision because it does not guarantee an adequate level of basic support. By contrast, unanimous groups with 4 women are predicted to provide a total guaranteed income of \$16'147, and the models predict that unanimous groups with 5 women will begin to approach the income amounts that deliberators indicated was fair and decent for themselves.<sup>3</sup>

This analysis is merely suggestive, since we do not have enough groups in general and data on gender composition in the majority rule condition is especially sparse. However, the important point for now is that the impact of unanimity may differ considerably with gender composition in affecting

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<sup>3</sup> Holding other variables constant. The majority groups, by contrast, show no statistically significant increase with the number of women, though we note that this majority condition result stands on very weak data legs given the dearth of female groups in the majority rule condition.

the level of destitution people tolerate in their deliberating society. In addition, the Frohlich and Oppenheimer data also reveal other group-based effects that show in powerful ways how groups are more than the mere sum of their parts.

We find, for example, that group gender composition and decision rule also interact to affect individual-level satisfaction with group outcomes. That is, participants in unanimous groups with more women were more satisfied with their discussions than those in other conditions, holding a variety of other variables constant. This satisfaction is not a result of individual gender, because it is experienced by both men and women in the groups. Unanimity does not polarize *individuals* according to gender. Rather, it polarizes *groups* according to gender. Unanimity sets group norms, norms that vary by gender composition and that affect the satisfaction experienced by both men and women with the group decision. We find similar results with respect to productivity and certainty about their individual preferences. Members of unanimous groups with more women, whether those individuals were men or women, became, on average, more productive in the experimental tasks and more certain about their beliefs regarding principles of distributive justice. The finding with respect to certainty is especially meaningful because certainty was measured both before and after group discussion. Notably, *the interaction of gender composition and unanimity does not appear until after the discussion takes place*; before discussion, the group's gender composition has no impact on individual levels of certainty.

What can we make of our findings in light of the group polarization hypothesis? The standard hypothesis argues that polarization occurs in a group with many women simply because the average opinion before discussion favours generosity, with group discussion serving merely to reinforce this prior tendency. We depart somewhat from this approach to argue that gender matters not only in shaping pre-discussion preferences but also in shaping the nature of the discussion and of the norms that develop during it. To put the standard polarization hypothesis to the test against the gendered discussion hypothesis, we estimated the impact of group ideology on the group's generosity, satisfaction and productivity. If the impact of gender simply reflects the fact that women tend to go into discussions with more liberal views and a greater concern for the poor, then replacing group gender with group ideology or a measure of the group's socio-economic status should yield a similar pattern of results. But that is not what we find. While in the unanimous condition having more women results in

more generosity to the poor, we find few such effects (and what effects we find are greatly muted compared to gender) when we substitute liberalism or class into the equation. Neither does controlling for the effects of ideology or class decrease the impact of gender composition.

In order to conclude that norms influence the outcome of deliberation, it is necessary to show that norms operate in the discussion. Because we have access to transcripts of each group's deliberation, we are able to explore directly the ways in which group discussion mediates the interactive impact of the group's gender composition and the decision rule. Relying on Roderick Hart's software programme DICTION, we analysed how the characteristics of group discussion varied across different kinds of groups. To some extent, it seems that the gender composition of the group shapes its discussions regardless of the decision rule. The presence of more women leads the members of the group to be more open about their doubts and the gaps in their knowledge. The effect of having more women in a group, however, is magnified by the unanimous decision rule, which leads groups with more women to be more frank about the problems they perceive and also to indicate more satisfaction during the course of discussion. Unanimous rule renders a group with more women a more unified, more cooperative, less antagonistic, more thorough and more task-oriented unit than an all-male group. In majority rule groups, however, a larger number of women fails to give groups similar benefits. We take this as strong support for the notion that gendered norms exert a powerful effect on the nature of group discussion.

In sum, the Deliberative Justice Experiment offers preliminary but promising evidence that a unanimous decision rule interacts with gender composition to create norms that emerge during deliberation and that shape the group's decision-making, perceptions of legitimacy, and even individual performance on an unrelated task. If the group is composed primarily of women, it is more generous than it would be under majority rule, and subsequently generates greater productivity, more satisfaction with the group's decision, and a higher level of certainty about – and thus more commitment to – the group's decision. These outcomes are mediated strongly by the nature of the group's discussion – groups with strong norms and larger numbers of women not only produce different decisions, but they also have, quite simply, very different sorts of conversations than other groups. In unanimous groups with more women, the discussion is more deliberative – more open-minded, collectively-oriented and empathic.

## Juries and Group Effects

In light of these suggestive findings, we have also pursued the question of group-level dynamics in other settings. Mendelberg (2007) has, for example, explored group-level effects in the context of juries, a setting of special importance to both deliberative theory and democratic practice. The data analysed by Mendelberg come from a study of “mock” juries collected for a different purpose by Schkade et al. (2000). The data set consists of 503 groups of six adults and 6 groups of five adults registered to vote and eligible for jury duty in Arizona. The participants in the study were recruited by random draw, and provided with a summary of a legal case randomly chosen out of fifteen cases. The fifteen case summaries were based on actual cases and, like the Deliberative Justice Experiment, required participants to deliberate about important issues of social welfare and the distribution of society’s resources. In each case an ordinary individual plaintiff sued a large, wealthy company. Mock jurors were informed that a guilty verdict had already been handed down and compensatory damages awarded. They were asked to confidentially record their individual decision about punitive damages in the case, in the form of a dollar amount or a punishment rating ranging from 0 to 8. The order – dollars first or rating first – was randomly assigned to juries, with individuals randomly assigned to a jury. Jurors were then asked to deliberate for half an hour as a jury on the same dimension (dollars or rating) and to arrive at a jury verdict through consensus. In the second stage they were asked to confidentially record their individual decision again, in dollars if they had already indicated ratings, or in ratings if they had indicated dollars, and to deliberate on that dimension and reach a jury verdict by consensus.

The jury study does not vary the decision rule, so it does not provide a direct test of our hypotheses about the interaction between norms and group composition. It does, however, allow for considerable insight into the ways in which group-level factors shape individual preferences. If deliberation simply heightens the impact of individual-level variables, for example, we expect it merely to reinforce people’s prior views. If, on the other hand, deliberation creates group-level forces that work independently of individual priors, then we should find a very different set of results. And it is the power of the group that emerges most strongly from Mendelberg’s re-analysis of the Schkade et al. (2000) data. Prior to group discussion, individual-level socio-demographic variables are strongly predictive of individual preferences, while group-level factors like the mock jury’s racial

or gender composition matter not at all. After group discussion, however, the situation is reversed: the effect of individual-level variables is muted considerably, while the group's composition, especially its racial composition, exerts a large and powerful effect. In fact, individual preferences after discussion are shaped to a greater extent by group composition than by the individual's own race or gender.

Nor are the effects simply a linear function of adding or subtracting a member of a given gender or racial group; effects appear to be non-linear and interactive. The effects of gender, for example, are concentrated among groups with large numbers of females. Put differently, men surrounded by large numbers of females are likely to move away from their pre-deliberation preferences and become more inclined to punish wealthy corporations – and the effect is double to triple the impact of individual gender on proclivity to punish. Similarly, being surrounded by racial minorities exerts a powerful effect on punitiveness toward wealthy corporations. This effect holds for all races, but it is especially profound when people of colour find themselves surrounded by other racial minorities. Group-level preferences are also strongly affected by the group's composition, and again the effect is non-linear.

The results reveal that the group indeed matters. Group composition variables shape the outcome just as powerfully as do individual variables, if not more so. While the social cleavages of race and gender are no doubt important as characteristics of individuals, they are even more powerful as traits of groups. The group's mix of women and men and whites and non-whites in particular seems to influence the individual at least as much as, and sometimes more than, the person's own race or gender. Because the results obtain only after discussion and even after controlling for prior preferences, the effect of group structure appears to depend on the group-level processes that occur as group members deliberate together.

### **Group Deliberation and Language at Public Meetings**

Effective deliberation is challenging in part because it rests on language, and as we saw in the Deliberative Justice Experiment, group-level factors can profoundly influence the nature of the language employed during a discussion. We see this not only in controlled experiments, but also in observational studies of deliberation as it actually occurs in localities across the United States. In a study of local public hearings about Wal-Mart develop-

ment in a diverse set of communities around the United States, ranging from tiny Knightdale, North Carolina to bustling San Diego, California, Karpowitz and Frost (2007) find that the number of women who stand to speak has powerful effects on the nature of the public discourse at the meetings. In places where a greater percentage of speakers are women, for example, public arguments against Wal-Mart are much more likely to be characterized by appeals to communitarian principles. In other words, women make different kinds of arguments than men, and when more women address the meeting, public discourse changes in both direction and tone. These effects hold even after controlling for the individual effects of gender. In other words, the public deliberation practised by speakers of *both* genders changes as the group-level gender composition of the speakers moves toward gender parity.

In the Wal-Mart cases, changing gender composition meant a greater appeal to communitarian values, but group-level effects on public language can also cut sharply against deliberative ideals and complicate deliberative hopes. In a study of New Jersey town meetings held in both segregated and integrated environments, for example, Mendelberg and Oleske (2000) found that language used by whites in segregated meetings had the veneer of being universal, well-reasoned, focused on the common good, and supportive of the community consensus, but on closer inspection, such language also seemed to advance a narrow group interest (that is, the interests of privileged Whites). At integrated meetings, such language was decoded by many non-Whites as racist and an obstruction to the larger public good. When the meetings were comprised of racially diverse speakers, it became clear that the language that had seemed so promising in the segregated condition might actually undermine attempts to find solutions acceptable to all racial groups. This meant that racial minorities left the integrated meeting feeling frustrated and angry because of words that, in the segregated setting, had left Whites feeling hopeful and united.

In other words, the very meaning of language and community was in dispute, and the simple fact of group discussion was not enough to bridge racial differences. Instead, the differing group composition of the meetings brought profoundly different interpretations of language into sharp relief and raised questions about how deliberative institutions might (or might not) be able to bridge such deep divides.

## Conclusion

We have argued here that a key to understanding deliberation is to study it as a process of interaction. In order to do so, it is necessary to recognize that deliberation is shaped by group level variables and group forces. We have illustrated several ways to do so, which entail examining the consequences of the group's composition or its decision rule or the interactive effects of both composition and decision rule on group outcomes on individual attitudes, and even on the language used by deliberators. Our hope in reviewing these studies, which are, admittedly, still preliminary, is to provoke more and better exploration of deliberation as a group process as well as the institutions in which such processes occur. One of the primary aims of our continuing work together, for example, is to collect more data with sufficient numbers of groups and random assignment to group conditions. The key, we believe, is to use a multi-method approach that draws on both real-world observation and controlled experiments to understand the conditions under which deliberating groups are likely to come closer to deliberative standards as well as the conditions that are likely to end in deliberative frustration and failure.

The group-level forces that we have described are powerful, and they may not always work in the direction toward which optimistic deliberative theorists would point. For example, deliberativists may be correct in assuming that discussion matters, but it may matter not because people are exchanging arguments with dissenters, as deliberative theorists would like, but rather because of social factors. Rather than listening to and evaluating each other's diverse arguments, rather than broadening each other's perspective, deliberators may instead act based on the number of speakers in favour of a position, the social or political influence of a faction, the sheer frequency of an argument, their need to feel part of a consensus of values, or their desire to be accepted by the group. Perhaps deliberation functions as an opportunity for deliberators to present themselves as good exemplars of the group norm. If that is so, then deliberation serves a social purpose at odds with the goals of deliberative theorists. By the same token, perhaps deliberation functions not to air different perspectives but to bring minority views into line with majority views. In short, good deliberation can be undermined by group norms.

On the other hand, group dynamics research does provide some hope for deliberative expectations. That literature provides a general lesson of great use to deliberativists: the structural factors of group discussion mat-

ter, and they can be controlled. The key is to specify what structural factors lead to the kind of deliberation envisioned by theorists.

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### Gruppen und Deliberation

Der Artikel präsentiert einen gruppenbasierten Ansatz der Deliberationsforschung. Obwohl Deliberation stets in Gruppen stattfindet, wird dieser Tatsache in der bisherigen Forschung nur selten Rechnung getragen. Im Gegensatz dazu argumentieren die Autoren, dass sowohl die Gruppenzusammensetzung wie auch die daraus entstehenden sozialen Dynamiken Deliberation entscheidend beeinflussen. Der Artikel zeigt anhand verschiedener Beispiele, wie Gruppen in deliberativen Situationen untersucht werden können. Beschrieben werden insbesondere die Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Frauenanteil einer Gruppe und der geltenden Entscheidungsregel in einer experimentellen Untersuchung zum Thema Gerechtigkeit, der Effekt der ethnischen Zusammensetzung in simulierten Geschworenenverhandlungen sowie die Konsequenzen verschiedener ideologischer Zusammensetzungen in Diskussionen auf lokaler Ebene. Die Autoren untersuchen, wie sich diese Gruppenmerkmale auf Faktoren wie Meinungen und Verhalten von Einzelpersonen sowie auf die in der Gruppe getroffenen Entscheidungen auswirken. Der Artikel schliesst mit einer Einschätzung der Bedeutung von Gruppeneffekten für die empirische und normative Deliberationsforschung.

### Groupes et Délibération

Cet article présente une approche basée sur la notion de groupe de l'étude de la délibération. De nombreuses études sur la délibération ne tiennent pas compte du groupe comme unité d'analyse. L'article démontre cependant que la composition du groupe et les dynamiques sociales qui en naissent représentent un aspect important de la délibération. Plusieurs exemples sur la manière d'étudier ces effets sont présentés, comme l'interaction entre la composition genrée et des règles de décision du groupe dans le contexte d'une étude expérimentale sur les décisions quant à la justice, l'effet de la

composition raciale de jurys simulés, ainsi que l'effet de la composition idéologique dans des assemblées locales. Ensuite, les conséquences de ces facteurs sur la diversité des résultats sont examinées, en incluant l'opinion personnelle et le comportement des individus, de même que les décisions groupales. En conclusion, les auteurs discutent les implications que les effets de groupe ont sur les théories empiriques et normatives de la délibération.

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